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The ethical ambivalence of resistant violence: notes from postcolonial south Asia 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In the face of mounting militarism in south Asia, this essay turns to anti-state, „liberatory‟ 
movements in the region that employ violence to achieve their political aims. It explores some of 
the ethical quandaries that arise from the embrace of such violence, particularly for feminists for 
who political violence and militarism is today a moot point. Feminist responses towards resistant 
political violence have, however, been less straightforward than the violence of the state 
suggesting a more ambivalent ethical position towards the former than the latter. The nature of 
this ambivalence can be located in a postcolonial feminist ethics that is conceptually committed 
to the use of political violence in certain, albeit exceptional circumstances on the basis of the 
ethical ends that this violence (as opposed to other oppressive violence) serves. In opening up this 
ethical ambivalence – or the ethics of ambiguity, as Simone de Beauvoir says – to interrogation 
and reflection, I underscore the difficulties involved in ethically discriminating between forms of 
violence especially when we consider the manner in which such distinctions rely on and 
reproduce gendered modes of power. This raises particular problems for current feminist 
appraisals of resistant political violence as an expression of women‟s empowerment and 
„agency‟.  
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Political violence and militarization have become an indelible part of the narrative of postcolonial 
south Asia. The political violence of genocidal proportion that marked the birth of nations in the 
region has continued to structure everyday life in the post-independence decades, becoming more 
and more militarised in several instances. The militarization of civil society– observable, for 
instance, in the public enthusiasm towards the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan – exemplifies 
not simply the normalisation of military ideology but a wide-ranging consent to militarised forms 
of life (John 2004:305). Such consent is produced and sustained not only by the structures of the 
state but also by those that fall outside its ambit including non-state or even anti-state actors. 
Although less acknowledged, the resistant politics of revolutionary movements have also 
contributed their fair share to the wider militarization of these societies (as elsewhere). The 
countering of statist militarism with forms of revolutionary militarism that tend to become 
indistinguishable from the former raise pressing but unanswered questions to do with political 
ethics.  
 
The issue of ethics particularly the ethics of political violence is what is at stake in this essay that 
takes as its point of departure resistant political struggles in contemporary south Asia. Ethical 
norms and values lie at the heart of any discussion of violence, whether to do with a narrow 
consideration of its use value or broader issues around its legitimacy and justification. These 
concerns are arguably more complex when we turn to the politics of resistant violence, generally 
justified as a response to the violence of the state, and for the sake of democratic ends. In fact, the 
moral economy in which such violence is located has not only precluded, in many instances, its 
outright condemnation but has also prevented a serious consideration of its underlying ethical 
presuppositions and ambiguities. While a recipe for establishing an ethical response to political 
violence may not be possible (or even desirable), the ethics of violence, whether state sanctioned 
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or not, must be taken seriously even if only to acknowledge the difficulty that such a task 
involves.  
 
In the context from where I speak – India – a discourse, however provisional, on the ethics of 
resistant violence assumes a degree of urgency in the face of a rapidly deteriorating stand-off 
between the state and revolutionary groups, and its spin-off effect on ordinary people, everyday 
life, and progressive politics more generally. I also speak with the theoretical resources of 
feminism which, as politics and knowledge, is deeply committed to the struggle against violence 
and militarism. In south Asia, as Manchanda (2004) notes, both the state and oppositional 
movements have mobilized women, and also subsumed their interests to larger nationalist and 
socialist projects inscribing a „patriarchal containment‟ (de Mel 2001) of women in the political 
domain. Notwithstanding this critique, feminists have responded to the violence of anti-state 
movements with a degree of ambivalence; one that cannot be found in their engagement with 
other forms of (state/rightwing) violence. This might stem from the „sustained, if qualified, 
support‟ (John 2004:305) that postcolonial feminism has generally offered anticolonial and other 
„liberatory‟ struggles even those that deploy violence to achieve their ends.  
 
In the contemporary context of women‟s (often violent) political mobilization in south Asia, the 
ethical significance of political violence raises contextually specific as well as broader questions 
to do with women‟s place in „men‟s wars‟, whether just or unjust. Should feminists argue for 
women‟s equal rights to take up arms against repression and injustice or should they champion 
the democraticisation and demilitarisation of such struggles? Should they celebrate the 
unexpectedly large numbers of women that have joined the ranks of south Asian insurgencies as a 
measure of their „agency‟ or should they challenge the militarization of women‟s identities 
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therein? Like Virginia Woolf, should they seek to liberate men and masculinity from militarism 
or insist on the expansion of the sphere of war and combat to include women? At the heart of 
these ethical quandaries lie certain assumptions about violence, power and gender that need to be 
interrogated or at least reflected on. These include, I show in this essay, assumptions to do with 
the nature and practice of violence including the possibility of ethically discriminating between 
forms of violence. Such distinctions tend to rely on and further entrench gendered norms and 
hierarchies especially when we consider how militarized discourses of resistance employ gender 
as an „ethical shorthand‟ (Hutchings 2007a:101) to justify their use of violence. The assumption 
that resistant violence might be „empowering‟ for women also tends to reproduce a victim-agent 
binary in thinking about postcolonial subjectivities from a feminist perspective. The fact that 
gender plays a crucial role in producing certain kinds of violence and its subjects means that 
ethics cannot be approached from the perspective of feminism alone but from an understanding 
of how ethics itself is fully imbricated by issues of power including gendered modes of power (cf. 
Hutchings 2007a). Such a feminist ethics – especially a postcolonial one that is conceptually 
committed to distinctions between ethical and unethical uses of violence – must also stem from 
an appreciation of the deeply ambiguous nature of political action to which an autonomous agent 
cannot be readily ascribed.  
 
Feminist ethics and political violence  
In a recent article, Kimberly Hutchings (2007a) delineates three dominant trends within feminist 
ethics and their implications for assessing the ethical legitimacy of the use of violence for 
political ends. Given that this is one of the few recent feminist reflections on the ethics of 
violence including revolutionary violence, it provides a useful starting point for some of the 
tensions that this essay seeks to explore. Very briefly, Hutchings identifies an enlightenment 
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feminist ethics that upholds universal standards of justice and freedom, a care ethics that draws 
on women‟s distinctive but universal capacity for motherhood to argue for a unique female moral 
perspective, and postcolonial feminist ethics that rejects the ethical universalism of both these 
traditions for the recognition of difference and plurality or the particular social and cultural 
context in which ethical dilemmas are situated. In paying close attention to issues of context and 
their meaning (including the context of an unequal world order), postcolonial feminists 
acknowledge that „the same ethical norm may have very different implications in different places 
at different times‟ (Hutchings 2007a:94). 
 
From the perspective of a postcolonial feminist ethics, questions around war, violence and 
militarism (as with the categories of „woman‟ and „gender‟) cannot be dealt with a prior but 
within specific cultural and political contexts and the ethical challenges that lie therein. Such an 
ethical position opens up the possibility for feminism in a postcolonial mode to discriminate 
between forms of „good‟ and „bad‟ violence, and to support the use of violence for certain ethical 
ends (such as the self-determination of an oppressed people). To this extent, postcolonial 
feminism is not entirely different from an enlightenment feminism that is conceptually linked to 
the possibility of legitimising the use of violence in certain circumstances such as humanitarian 
intervention against genocide. Both traditions (unlike care feminism that Hutchings associates 
with pacifism) are, in this way, close to just war thinking in that they legitimate the use of 
political violence in highly exceptional circumstances.  
 
What Hutchings does not underscore but is more than obvious in feminist appraisals of militant 
anticolonial and nationalist struggles as „empowering‟ for women (cf. Mama 1997; Omolade 
1994; Cock 1994) is an endorsement of violence not only for politically progressive but also 
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feminist ends. Violence is justified, in other words, not only as a „necessary evil‟ on behalf of an 
oppressed group but also for the sake of an invisible minority therein, namely women. Thus Cock 
(1994) argues that unlike liberal forms of western feminism, revolutionary feminism in a third 
world context is often militarist: it asserts women‟s equal rights with men to take up arms against 
repression and injustice. Beyond the call for equality, the revolutionary nature of such struggles is 
seen as affording women the opportunity for politicisation, especially in military or combatant 
roles that have been historically unavailable to them. Such an ethical position legitimates the use 
of revolutionary violence in order to fulfil not just antioppressive ends but even feminist ones. 
The mobilisation of gender to justify violence is also, I argue in what follows, at the heart of the 
problematic of resistant violence for a feminist ethics. What such an ethics tends to ignore more 
generally is the role of gender „in the fabric of ethical values, judgment and action in both 
principle and practice‟ (Hutchings 2007a:91). For Hutchings, ethics cannot be understood as a 
category that is distinct from or unaffected by issues of politics and power. In order to seriously 
engage with the ethics of political violence from a feminist perspective, what is required, then, is 
an appreciation of the degree to which ethics is rooted in (and not outside of) gendered relations 
of power. Before moving onto an exploration of this problematic, it is necessary to place it in the 
context of contemporary south Asia.  
 
Contextualizing resistant politics  
„Resistant politics‟ is a broad, unwieldy category whether applied in the context of south Asia 
(itself a heterogeneous category; cf. Kumar 1994) or elsewhere. My usage of the term 
encompasses fairly but not entirely disparate political struggles that have „particular and general 
histories‟ (Banerjee et al. 2004:128) in the post-independence decades. These are primarily anti-
state „liberatory‟ struggles that have mobilized groups on the basis of identity categories like 
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religion and ethnicity for the establishment of national liberation or secession from the state, or 
freedom from class oppression within the nation-state (or a combination of these factors). The 
„armed‟ or militant nature of these struggles is a major point of commonality given that the 
organizations leading these movements are frequently identified as military, guerilla or even 
„terrorist‟ ones, especially by the state. The most prominent of these is the decade long 
ethnonationalist conflict in Sri Lanka between the state and the Tamil led militant Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and equally by separatist groups struggling for an independent 
Kashmir. Less known are the ultra-left „people‟s wars‟ currently waging across at least eight 
Indian states (recently declared by the Indian Prime Minister to be the „gravest internal security 
challenge‟ faced by the country), separatist groups in India‟s north-east and in Bangladesh, and 
the recent Maoist insurgency in Nepal. Religious nationalisms such as Islamisation in Pakistan 
and hindutva in India – what some have referred to as pro-state as opposed to anti-state 
nationalisms (Alison 2004) – are further militarizing civil and political society through a 
refashioning (rather than a rejection) of the state.  
 
Indian feminists have had to urgently respond to the rightwing mobilization of women in both 
leadership and rank-and-file positions in the new hindutva movement (cf. Butalia & Sarkar eds. 
1995). In contrast, much less been written of women‟s participation in anti-state revolutionary 
movements (with the exception perhaps of the Sri Lankan case). This in spite of the fact that 
„ultra left‟ militant groups in India, varyingly called Naxalites or Maoists, have seen a steady 
increase in the ranks of their female cadres, some even engaged in combat.
i
 Women‟s 
participation in the recent Communist Party-led insurgency in Nepal – one of the most reported 
aspects of this allegedly „pro-woman‟ people‟s war– has grabbed some feminist attention (cf. 
Gautum, Banskota & Manchanda 2001; Manchanda 2004; Pettigrew & Shneiderman 2004). The 
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initial enthusiasm with which feminists welcomed images of „young, gun-toting guerrilla women‟ 
as a measure of the leadership‟s commitment to the „woman‟s question‟ seems to have waned in 
the face of the lack of any visible advancement of women‟s rights by the newly formed 
communist government.  
 
This is also true of the LTTE in whose ideologies and practices women play a prominent role, 
constituting between a third and a half of its membership including a well-established Women‟s 
Military Wing (Basu 2005). In spite of the visibility afforded to women as combatants and 
suicide bombers – the most famous example being that of „Dhanu‟ who killed the Indian Prime 
Minister, Rajiv Gandhi and herself– feminists have lamented the tendency of women being 
reduced to mere „cogs in the wheel‟ given their containment through regulative patriarchal ideals 
„at the very moment of their most innovative empowerment‟ (de Mel 2001:212). In general, as de 
Alwis (1998) rightly observes, the feminist debate around women‟s participation in militant 
movements has been framed in binary terms: perceiving them as liberated or subjugated subjects; 
as victims or (as increasingly the case) agents of violence. 
 
Ambivalent agency  
Political violence, especially that of the state, has been a primary point of address for feminist 
theorizing, critique, and mobilization. In India, for instance, a self-conscious „feminist‟ women‟s 
movement emerged as a response to the institutional violence of the state and its agents like the 
police. In more recent times, feminists have turned to the violent underpinnings of the hindutva 
movement, viewing it as equally oppressive and deplorable as the state‟s exercise of violence, 
notwithstanding the possibility of politicization that it might offer women. When we turn to the 
political violence of anti-state, revolutionary struggles, the picture becomes slightly more 
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complex. It would be fair to say that unlike the state or the religious right, there has been no 
comparable assessment and critique of resistant violence from a feminist perspective. The 
feminist attitude to such violence is also much more ambivalent.  
 
The left legacy of feminist politics might explain this more ambivalent stance towards the 
violence of oppositional, including left-inspired movements. Most women‟s movements in south 
Asia have socialist roots; the left constitutes an important legacy for feminist mobilizing in the 
region. As Omvedt (1993:216) notes of the Indian women‟s movement, feminists have always 
identified with the left with specific implications for the question of political violence: 
„particularly in India, where the tenacity of the Naxalite effort to build a force based on the rural 
poor made them romantic heroes to so many, an endorsement of violence seemed to provide the 
distinction between paternalistic Gandhism and the dividing line in the communist movement 
between “revisionists” and “revolutionaries”‟. Besides the political alternative that it provided, 
revolutionary violence was morally acceptable because of the appeal of the „heroism of guerrilla 
warriors‟ but also owing to the popularisation of images of „the woman with a gun in her arms 
and a baby on her back‟ (Ibid). This image of the mother-warrior is one that has a longstanding 
presence in the imaginary of „liberatory‟, especially nationalist struggles in the „third world‟, and 
is an acknowledged part of a revolutionary femininity. The combined force of these symbolic 
structures has meant that the question of women‟s empowerment could readily be decoupled 
from that of violence in the context of liberation struggles (cf. Omvedt 1993:216).  
 
The separation between emancipation and violence is also implicit in the historical recovery of 
women‟s participation in peasant and working class struggles, especially in Telengana and 
Tebhaga in India.
ii
 Feminists sought to recover these histories in „celebrating a lineage of 
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resistance‟ (Stree 1989:19) as well as countering the longstanding orientalist „myth of passivity‟ 
with respect to Asian women (Trivedi 1984:38). Violence, in this mode of feminist history 
writing, is identified in the leadership practices of these movements (the „Party‟) that thwarted the 
possibility of emancipation that revolutionary upheaval – that „magic time‟ (Lalitha & 
Kannabiran 1989) – held out for women. In general, these works are limited to clearly 
identifiable „women‟s issues‟ such as patriarchy and sexuality, and do not extend to broader 
concerns of political violence and its implications for feminist ethical aspirations and ends.
iii
 
 
 
Discussions on resistant politics in contemporary south Asia have explicitly acknowledged (if not 
always engaged with) their violent and increasingly more militarised nature. The recent visibility 
of women as perpetrators and not strictly as victims of armed conflict is partly responsible for 
this more reflexive stance toward political violence.
iv
 Women‟s active involvement in militarised 
political cultures such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka and Maoist groups in Nepal (and to a lesser 
extent, in India) has raised specific concerns for the feminist project; one of acknowledging the 
possibility of women‟s empowerment in the „crucible of a militarized, hierarchical, authoritarian 
culture of violent politics‟ (Manchanda 2004:237). Manchanda‟s research on south Asian 
conflicts is typical of recent studies that point to the ambivalent nature of the „agency‟ that 
violent „liberatory‟ struggles offer women, and beyond that, to the inadvertent and „ambivalent 
gains‟ of conflict itself (de Mel 2001; Alison 2004; Pettigrew & Shneiderman 2004; 
Rajasingham-Senanyake 2004). The female combatant is viewed as an important instance of this 
„agency‟; one that belies the „natural‟ association of women with peace but also the presumed 
passivity of women (particularly third world women) within a narrative of war (cf. Manchanda 
2001; Alison 2004; Coomaraswamy & Fonseka 2004).
v
 Yet the continuing predominance of a 
discourse of victimization in south Asia‟s war zones has not only impeded, it is said, a serious 
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consideration of such ambivalent and ambiguous forms of agency but it has also limited concrete 
attempts towards the establishment of peace (Rajasingham-Senanyake 2004).  
 
I want to suggest that the ambivalence that these studies speak of with regard to armed conflict is 
an instance of the more general ambivalence towards political violence that we have already 
noted of postcolonial feminism. The underlying tensions of the feminist stance towards resistant 
violence can be attributable to its reliance on the left but also to wider transnational articulations 
of revolutionary feminism. They also stem from a wider assessment of anti-state „liberatory‟ 
nationalisms as being more politically enabling for women than pro-state nationalisms that 
invariably restrict women‟s expressions of autonomy (Alison 2004).vi This ambivalence suggests 
the following: that the use of violence could be politically and socially enabling for women, even 
as such violence contributes to the wider militarization of society, and is generally deplorable to 
feminists. For some, this ambivalence is read as a feminist failure to acknowledge women‟s 
agency in times of armed conflict and war. On the one hand, for secular feminists, „women‟s 
political violence is often the uncomfortable black hole wherein women‟s agency, because 
violent, becomes a male patriarchal project‟ (Rajasingham-Senanayake 2004:151). On the other 
hand, feminists have failed to perceive „the unintended transformations brought by war, of seeing 
positives in violence, lest we be branded “war-mongers”‟ (2004:147). The tension that Hutchings 
outlines in a feminist position that keeps open the use of violence in certain circumstances is 
exemplified here. For here we have a feminist position that condemns violence but 
acknowledges, even endorses violence that might have unintended positive outcomes for women. 
The mobilisation of gender to justify violence is also, I argue in what follows, at the heart of the 
problematic of resistant violence for a feminist ethics.  
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Ethical Ambiguities: means and ends   
Together with Hutchings, I have identified a distinction between forms of violence on ethical 
(and feminist) grounds as part of the postcolonial feminist response to violence in general and 
resistant violence in particular. Hutchings (2007a:100) notes that a prominent way of critiquing 
such positions relates to the ability to distinguish between ethical and unethical uses of violence. 
Such distinctions, based on an instrumental understanding of means and ends and the ability to 
accurately calculate means in relation to the ends or outcomes of actions, are hard to sustain in 
practice even if they might make sense in principle. Generally speaking, even though our actions 
might be oriented towards and determined by known ends, we cannot control (by 
calculating/knowing in advance) the outcomes of our actions. The tension between ends and 
outcomes (one that Hutchings seems to conflate in the distinction between means and ends) 
makes all action lacking in clarity, predictability, and definiteness. Elsewhere Hutchings (2007b) 
draws on Simone de Beauvoir‟s discussion of the ethics of resistant political violence, where she 
argues that human existence or human action (including violent action) is inherently ambiguous 
because it lacks certainty and predictability. De Beauvoir criticises new left violence on the 
grounds that instrumental justifications of political violence, grounded in unsustainable divisions 
between means and ends, deny this ambiguity by positing certainty and calculation in its stead.
vii
  
 
The fact that the impact and implications of the use of political violence cannot be calculated in 
advance makes it hard to control the kinds of violent excesses that have become near 
synonymous with ultra left politics in south Asia, for instance. These include the manner in which 
the exercise of resistant violence invariably mirrors and leads to further oppressive violence, 
besides the high probability that violence against oppressors may be used against those who are 
not directly responsible for oppression (Hutchings 2007b). The dominance of internal killings as 
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a way of dealing with „informants‟ is paradigmatic of the former while the routine killing of 
civilians caught in the crossfire between the state and guerrilla forces is an instance of the latter. 
Less obvious (and certainly less acknowledged in feminist scholarship/activism) is the manner in 
which such left-inspired violent politics actively produce (rather than simply enable) other 
violences including violence against women. In my own research on the sixties and seventies 
extreme left Naxalbari movement of West Bengal
viii
, I noted how the political violence employed 
by the state and responded to by the revolutionary was continuous with other forms of everyday, 
especially gender-based and sexual violence (cf. Roy 2008). To take a very small example, the 
construct of the state (especially that of a rapist state) aided the creation of an illusion of safety 
within the movement; it magnified the violence that existed „out there‟, in the public domain, 
while rendering invisible the gender-based violence (including rape) that middle class women 
activists faced within the community, at the hands of their own comrades. Not surprisingly, such 
violence was rendered largely unspeakable within the movement. Suffice it to say that the manner 
in which political violence not only implicates but also produces other violence (as well as the 
possibilities of witnessing and resisting violence) suggests that „distinctions that make sense in 
principle are unsustainable in practice‟ (Hutchings 2007a:100).  
 
It should be obvious from this discussion that the decision to use political violence cannot be a 
matter of calculation or moral certainty; nor can it rely on ethical distinctions that are grounded in 
a narrow instrumental rationality (as with most „liberatory‟ movements). It must be made on the 
basis of engaging with the ethical basis of violence. And ethics, Simone de Beauvoir (1976) 
notes, is grounded in uncertainty. It involves an avowal of our own ambiguous (as opposed to 
socio-historically transcendent) nature, and the necessarily limited nature of all our actions. Thus 
we can justify recourse to violence not on the basis of moral certainty or by positing unrevisable 
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ends but on the basis of the necessarily ambiguous nature of human action and the revisable 
nature of human ends. However, such an ethical position – an ethics of ambiguity – makes it far 
harder to justify the use of violence in advance, or even to raise the question about whether 
violence can be justified in such and such circumstances (as with certain postcolonial and 
enlightenment feminist positions). For underlying this question is an assumption that violence is 
an external other that needs to be overcome as opposed to a set of practices that is „rooted in the 
world and in subjects‟ (Hutchings 2007b:127), including a world that is necessarily structured by 
gendered relations of power.  
 
Gendered ambiguities  
The ambiguity that de Beauvoir speaks of is very often denied in ethical discriminations of 
violence, and not only to do with distinctions between means and ends. Like de Beauvoir‟s 
„serious man‟, the revolutionary acts with a high degree of moral certainty with respect to actions 
and ends that are, per force, judged to be right. There is thus a denial of ambiguity, and violence 
becomes for the revolutionary a matter of course rather than an ethical choice (Hutchings 
2007b:126). The denial of ambiguity is not limited, however, to the revolutionary agent alone. 
The reading of resistance often mirrors the moral economies within which resistance is located, 
inviting us to view individuals and actions on the basis of absolute moral binaries „as either all 
bad or all good, sinful or virtuous, noble or ignoble‟ (Bourgois 2002:222). Such polarized 
understandings have meant that the battle lines between the revolutionary and the state get drawn 
all too starkly, engendering a series of splits between just and unjust wars, legitimate and 
illegitimate violence, and the „good‟ and „bad‟ man. What tends to get lost in this need to take 
sides is the grey nature of revolutionary (and indeed all) violence, and the ambiguity under whose 
sign revolutionary relations are often lived in the course of such struggles (see Roy 2008).  
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It is important to mention that a scholarly (including feminist) investment in ethical divisions in 
violence has also precluded, in some instances, a full assessment of the multiple forms and 
meanings that violence assumes within revolutionary movements. This is especially true of the 
feminist engagement with contemporary Maoist and Naxalite groups in India. An underlying 
belief in the moral worth of revolutionary resistance seems to have generated an evasion of the 
question of violence and militarism (and their underlying patriarchal assumptions) even as 
feminists have debated issues such as sexuality, the politics of housework, and female political 
representation in the context of left political cultures (see Kannabiran & Kannabiran 2002). The 
possibility of emancipation has largely been debated, in other words, in separation from that of 
violence. There is also a tendency to view sexual violence as the dark underside of progressive 
politics, its perverted form rather than a product of violent political cultures.
ix
  
 
What should be of greater concern to these feminists (and postcolonial feminism more generally) 
is that the ethical divisions that justify forms of violence tend to rely on and reproduce a complex 
gendered economy of power. As we shall see in what follows, discourses of gender and sexuality 
are often key to the repertoire of rationalizing „good‟ political violence and producing its subjects 
(the revolutionary martyr, for instance). The fact that gender plays a major part in representing 
such violence (and even war) as „legitimate, honourable or desirable‟ (Treacher at al. 2008:1) 
poses, Hutchings (2007a:102) argues, a deep challenge to feminists especially those that defend 
the use of violence in certain conditions. For the postcolonial feminist, the challenge would be 
one of demonstrating how ethical distinctions between violence can be sustained in theory and in 
practice, and that too, without producing and reproducing the patriarchal positionings on which 
such violence and its legitimacy rely. A postcolonial ethics of violence would, thus, have to be 
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cognizant of the role and significance of gender in producing particular ethical positions and 
subjects in sustaining certain forms of violence.  
 
As Hutchings (2007a:101) herself acknowledges, there is a vast body of feminist scholarship that 
considers the mobilization of gender in ideologies and practices of political violence, be that 
nationalist political projects (Chatterjee 1989; Yuval-Davis & Anthias ed. 1989; Sarkar 2001; 
Jacoby 1999), military discourses, war and wider practices of militarization (Enloe 1989; Chenoy 
1998), discourses of humanitarian intervention (Young 2003 & 2007), rightwing nationalisms 
(Banerjee 2003; Bacchetta 2004), and ethnonationalist struggles (de Alwis 1998; de Mel 2001; 
Tambiah 2005; Haq 2007). The patriarchal underpinning of violence and militarization are 
known to have entrenched male power and privilege even in the case of anti-colonial, liberation 
struggles in the „third world‟ (see most recently, White 2007). The major themes uncovered by 
these studies have enormous bearing on the gendered logic of resistance, which, at least in the 
immediate context of south Asia, requires closer consideration.  
 
The sixties Naxalbari movement is paradigmatic in its mobilisation of the category „woman‟ in 
order to justify the use of revolutionary violence as key to class struggle. The sexual victimisation 
of peasant women at the hands of the state and the „ruling classes‟ was a major justification for 
armed struggle; itself discursively configured as a battle for honour or izzater lorai. Peasant 
women were central to this project given the cultural (and middle-class) construction of izzat or 
honour as located in the female body that sanctions, in turn, violent masculine protection and a 
limited degree of female agency (see Roy 2007). Middle class women, for their part, entered the 
revolutionary imaginary largely through the discourse of motherhood, whether as an enslaved 
mother/land that needed liberation or as a warrior-mother that aided the struggle against the „bad‟ 
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violence of the state.
x
 At the same time, middle class women activists were constructed in terms 
of their violability or „rapability‟ (Marcus 1992) at the hands of the state by which the Party could 
draw them within its protective, paternalistic care. An appeal to protection thus provided a 
„righteous rationale‟ (Young 2007:126) for violent class struggle besides reinforcing male 
superiority and female subordination in the political domain. As with protectionist discourses 
more generally (cf. Young 2003)
xi, the „good‟ women who deserves male protection is 
distinguished from the „bad‟ woman who is undeserving of it. This is especially salient in the 
manner in which the Party dealt with sexual violence at the hands of its own members and 
sympathisers. As I have detailed recently (Roy 2008), women‟s testimony to sexual violence by 
male workers and peasants was routinely disqualified on the basis of their own middle class 
status and the working class status of their aggressors. Class was thus key to distinctions between 
„good‟ and „bad‟ women within the discourse of protection.xii     
 
At least in the context of Naxalbari, ethical distinctions between good and bad violence and its 
subjects and objects were secured through particular mobilisations of „woman‟, and presumptions 
of femininity and masculinity. As Hutchings (2007a:101) notes more generally, it is hard to see 
how this rhetoric could work without relying on normative understandings of male and female, 
and a gendered division of labour. It is important to underscore, however, that the legitimation of 
political violence relied a complex network of power relations including those of class and caste 
and not gender or sexual difference alone. Both the female and subaltern subject were „useful‟ to 
the construction of Naxalite identity and to the validation of its politics although their iconic 
usefulness largely required them to „stay put‟ in the discursive domain of the movement (Gedalof 
1999:60). Yet the utility of „woman‟ – situated across and productive of multiple categories of 
identity including political identity – cannot be underestimated either. Unlike the familiar 
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characterisation of women as always victimised and marginalised by violence and war, the 
gendered politics of resistant violence points to the manner in which women are also 
foregrounded, made visible, and useful in the legitimation of violence and the constitution of its 
subjects (Gedalof 1999:49). Yet, as Gedalof (Ibid) is quick to remind us, the particular forms of 
visibility through which women emerge useful „make some forms of agency more acceptable 
than others within prevailing relations of power‟.   
 
Problematising power  
In this final section I want to briefly consider why positing the possibility of women‟s agency in 
the context of resistant violence might be problematic for feminism. What has emerged 
throughout this discussion is a tendency to view resistant politics as a space of emancipatory and 
agentive potentialities for women (even if these are rarely actualised). In spite of an 
acknowledgment of the „ambivalent‟ nature of such agency given a wider context of violence and 
even war, feminists have made it a point not to entirely discount the possibility of empowerment 
and agency (often used interchangeably) either. The question of agency – understood in this 
context as autonomy or power – assumes all the more importance once we consider the 
orientalist, colonialist and neoimperialist economies of thought within which third world woman 
have generally figured, of which „western‟ feminism is itself a product (cf. Mohanty 1991). The 
orientalist imagining of third world women as passive, powerless objects has propelled, in turn, 
the project of recovering and affirming the autonomy and subjectivity of non-western women; of 
reconstructing them as „active, autonomous subjects in their own right‟ (Stephens 1989:100). 
This quest for historically denied agency and subjectivity – often pursued as an unqualified good 
(cf. Sunder Rajan 2004)– needs to be located, I believe, in a wider mode of rationalising and 
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legitimising violence on the grounds of the self-determination and liberation of the subjects of 
feminism i.e. women.  
 
The idea that violence could give rise to self-determination and agency (whether for women or 
for any other group) is deeply problematic; the recurrent feminist claim of „ambivalence‟ with 
regard to women‟s agency in conditions of war is itself testament to this. Implicit in such a claim 
is recognition that agency does not usually involve the use of violence; „agency‟ is rather the 
freedom from violence or force. The use of violence to be free from violence is thus 
contradictory, and not at a conceptual level alone. There are enough historic instances that 
illustrate how violence tends to breed more violence in ways that undermine freedom and power. 
Violence and power are, for Hannah Arendt, opposites: violence is based on strength and force 
while power is a function of human relations; it involves collective action to bring about 
collective ends.
xiii
 Yet the tendency to conflate violence with power is pervasive. When feminists 
presume that certain forms of violence can restore power that has been historically denied to 
women, they too are complicit in this conflation.    
 
If we learn from Arendt that power and violence are opposites, we also know that modes of 
power are not always empowering or enabling for their subjects. Underscoring much of the 
feminist discussion on women‟s empowerment is an understanding of power (like agency) as a 
positive social good, an „inherently radical force or attribute of women and other subordinated 
groups‟ (Sunder Rajan 2004:327). As with a particular liberal feminist strand, such an 
understanding of power calls for women‟s greater participation „in and control of the existing 
structures of political power‟ (Ibid). The problem with such a redistributive model of power (as 
Young calls it) is that it tends to view questions of empowerment and agency largely in 
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abstraction, outside of their imbrication in wider „historically specific networks of power 
relations‟ (Gedalof 1999:53). It thus asks that women be included in structures and institutions of 
power leaving their normative and gendered nature largely unchallenged. In the immediate 
context of militarised resistant struggles in south Asia, feminists have observed that the entry and 
presence of women, while initially empowering, is regulated by rigid conformity to the 
masculinist and patriarchal ideologies of these organisations (Menon 2004:62). The historically 
overdetermined nature of women‟s victimology has, at the same time, made it incumbent upon 
feminists not to rest content with such narratives of victimisation alone. It is, however, one thing 
to „remain fixed to a one-dimensional conceptualisation of women as victims of war‟ 
(Coomaraswamy & Fonseka 2004:3), and quite another to assume that situations of widespread 
violence and conflict are actually favourable and even „liberatory‟ for women.  
 
One of the major contributions of feminist discussions on women‟s mobilisation in rightwing 
hindutva politics in India has been to complicate our understanding of power by suggesting that 
not all modes of power are equally liberatory for women or desirable for feminism (cf. Sarkar 
1991; Sangari 1993; Gedalof 1999; Sunder Rajan 2004). Rather than a straightforward 
association of power with empowerment, these discussions draw on an understanding of power as 
a modality of subjection or subjectification, in a Foucauldian sense, enabling and at once 
constraining the subject. The manner in which LTTE rhetoric, for instance, produces „woman‟ as 
a non-traditional, masculinised subject and as a carrier of national culture/tradition is one 
instance of the productive and repressive capacity of power (see de Mel 2007). The current 
feminist stress on „women‟s ambivalent agency‟ (Rajasingham-Senanayake 2004:143; emphasis 
added) in the realm of armed conflict can be seen as opening up the possibility of exploring the 
paradoxical nature of power as subjection. This is a largely lost opportunity given the underlying 
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construction of women as perpetually marginalised, silenced, and excluded from political 
projects, and of power, even military power, as a mode of restoring visibility to women.
xiv
 Such 
an argument effectively reproduces the victim-agent binary that it is at pains to deconstruct. On 
the one hand, it overestimates women‟s exclusion from the realm of political conflict in ways that 
ignore how „woman‟ and gender are central to the moral economy of resistant political violence, 
as explored previously. On the other hand and in a liberal feminist mode of rendering hitherto 
invisible „woman‟ visible, it problematically associates women‟s visibility in cultures of violent 
politics with a foregrounding of women‟s rights, empowerment and „agency‟. A way of moving 
beyond conceptions of power as either empowerment or subordination (the woman-as-victim or 
woman-as-subject/agent division) would be „to understand how the category of “woman”, the 
subject of feminism, is produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which 
emancipation is sought‟ (Butler 1990:2).   
 
Finally, and extremely problematically, the feminist association of militarised revolutionary 
struggles with „women‟s empowerment‟ condones rather than questions the use of political 
violence and the militarization of civil society. It contributes to the idea that such violence is 
morally permissible not only to achieve its own legitimate political ends but wider feminist ones. 
In the Indian context, it is particularly striking how feminists have shied away from condemning 
the routine recourse to violence by Maoists and Naxalites so much so that violence has become 
an end in itself. It has thus become possible for feminists to engage the „ultra left‟ on issues of 
political representation and leadership, for instance, without addressing the politics and ethics of 
violence and militarism and even to declare such politics as „the most radical in the country‟ 
(Kannabiran & Kannabiran 2002). The problem with such a feminist position is at least twofold. 
By reducing political ideology to its practice, it contributes to the perpetuation of the gendered 
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and patriarchal images on which this ideology depends (such as the feminised protectee or the 
warrior-mother). A second problem with this feminist stance is, as Young (2003:230) has noted 
of the use of „woman‟s liberation‟ in legitimising humanitarian intervention, that it does not „have 
principled ways of distancing itself from paternalist militarism‟. For Young (2003:231), a 
concern for the well-being of women is not a sufficient condition of feminism, which also 
requires a commitment to democratic values and citizenship on a global scale. Likewise, a 
feminist ethics of resistant political violence cannot be limited to narrowly construed „women‟s 
issues‟ to do with the politics of sexuality or the question of widening participation in the realm 
of resistance movements. It cannot, in other words, be concerned with gender or sexual difference 
alone at the cost of addressing a more complex moral economy of rationalizing and reproducing 
violence and war to which „woman‟ is central. 
   
Conclusion   
Even such a limited appraisal should make obvious the complexities involved in articulating a 
feminist ethics of resistant political violence in contemporary south Asia. While a singular vision 
of such an ethical position may not be possible or even desirable, it must at least grasp the 
underlying gendered politics of revolutionary violence. This includes, first, the manner in which 
conceptual distinctions between forms of violence (based on the ethical ends that they seek to 
achieve) are largely unsustainable in practice, especially when we consider how political violence 
tends to give rise to other (sexual, gender-based) violence. Second, I have argued, after 
Hutchings, that normative ideas of gender, masculinity and femininity are central to the 
legitimization of revolutionary violence as a „good‟ violence against the „bad‟ violence of an 
other. Distinctions between forms of violence on ethical grounds thus reinforce rather than 
disrupt existing gendered norms and hierarchies. Finally, a feminist ethics of resistant political 
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violence needs to consider the modes of agency and subjectivity that such violence makes 
available to women on the understanding that not all modes of subjecthood or power are equally 
desirable or „liberatory‟ for women. The „gender politics of political violence and its mode of 
justification‟ (Hutchings 2007a:103) should caution against the enthusiasm with which many 
have embraced the image of the female combatant as an index of women‟s power and equality. 
Constituting women as agents-of-violence, in this manner, entails making them a part of a moral 
paradigm that relies on and reinforces normative gendered hierarchies in defending violence in 
advance. How does such a mode of subjectivity – one that is testament to society‟s deep 
commitment to patriarchal norms of femininity and gender, if anything (Hutchings 2007a:101) – 
fulfill the postcolonial feminist agenda of „rescuing women from an underprivileged position in 
both knowledge and society‟ (Kumar 1994:8)? Yet to reject such an image is not necessarily to 
fall back on a historically overdetermined narrative of objectification. One way of transgressing 
the dichotomy between resistance and domination is available, I have suggested, in a more 
complex theory of power that addresses the ambiguous, even paradoxical nature of power in 
constituting subjects by constraining them to wider power relations. This might effectively free 
up feminists from viewing revolutionary moments as spaces of liberation or further subjugation 
to map, instead, how the rhetoric of revolution (and war) articulates itself through gendered 
power. A theoretical expansion of the feminist agenda might also address the ethical challenges 
involved in resistant political violence; challenges that cannot be met in the context of feminist 
goals alone but in a wider context of the gendered politics of political violence and militarism in 
south Asia today. That ethics does not furnish recipes and is a kind of a wager makes it even 
more imperative for feminists to partake in the „painfulness of an indefinite questioning‟ (de 
Beauvoir 1976:133) in which morality and even power may reside.   
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i
 A complex and contradictory formation, the „far left‟ in India includes mostly underground Maoist (or Naxalites as 
they are locally known) groups that draw on variations of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, united perhaps only in 
their commitment to the rallying cry of „people‟s war‟ or the armed overthrow of state power. While not constituting 
a serious challenge to the authority of the state or even the hegemony of the organised left, the political might of the 
far left cannot be underestimated either given the significant degree of national presence it today commands. It also 
has effective international links, such as with the Nepalese Maoists who, after nine years of insurgency and 
underground operations, have recently formed a coalition government with their leader as the new prime minister.   
ii
 See also Custers 1987 on Tebhaga; Saldhana 1986 on adivasi or tribal women and the Warli Revolt; Stree Shakti 
Sanghatana 1989; Lalitha & Kannabiran 1989 on Telangana; and more generally Omvedt 1980 & 1993.     
iiiWomen‟s groups like the Stree Shakti Sanghatana, responsible for the collection and publication of women‟s oral 
testimonies of Telengana, are themselves a product of radical left politics, deeply invested in the potency of left 
revolutionary ideals. See Kannabiran & Kannabiran 2002 on the history and legacy of this group.    
iv
 The increased participation of women in armed movements is not limited to south Asian countries; recent studies 
offer the basis for a good comparative approach to a transnational feminist ethics of political violence. See, for 
instance, Hasso 2005 and Hamilton 2007.  
v
 Titles such as „Women as Agents of Political Violence‟, „Women, War and Peace: Beyond Victimhood to agency‟, 
Women and the Maobaadi: Ideology and Agency in Nepal‟s Maoist Movement‟, „Ambivalent Empowerment: The 
Tragedy of Tamil Women in the Conflict‟, and „Victors, Perpetrators or Actors: Gender, Armed Conflict and 
Political Violence‟ speak of the wider impetus to affirm women‟s agency in violence. Outside of the immediate 
context of south Asia, there has also been an emphasis of moving beyond blanket and gender differentiated 
categories of „victims‟ and „agents‟ to recognize women‟s agency in violent conflict (cf. Giles 2001; Moser & Clark 
2001; Hamilton 2007; Coulter 2008)   
vi
 See, however, Sen‟s (2007) recent study of the women‟s wing of the Hindu right-wing party, the Shiv Sena in 
western India, which, she argues, provides women a degree of power and agency besides a way of coping with a life 
of poverty and uncertainty.    
vii
 It is also because we cannot know in advance the outcomes or consequences of the use of violence that violence 
(unlike power), according to Arendt (1970), can never be legitimate but calls for specific justification in particular 
instances. Like Simone de Beauvoir, Arendt is critical of new left violence on the basis of the impossibility of 
knowing in advance the outcomes or consequences of the use of violence for political ends. For both, means cannot 
be clearly distinguishable from the ends they serve. In the context of political struggles, means also tend to overtake 
ends such that violence becomes an end in itself.  
viii
 The Naxalbari movement began as a peasant uprising in northern West Bengal in 1967 led by a dissident group of 
the Communist Party of India (Marxist) who later formed the first of many Maoist parties in India. Popularly known 
as „naxalites‟, they declared a „people‟s war‟ against the Indian state structured on the Maoist model of protracted 
armed struggle. Middle class students, who left homes to „integrate‟ with the peasantry in the villages, emerged as an 
unlikely support base of the movement. The politics of violence that the movement professed cost it the initial 
popular support it enjoyed besides precipitating the brutal onslaught by the state which it could not withstand.  
ix
To take one recent example, Manchanda (2001:81-2) mentions cases of rape and abduction in the context of the 
armed militant movement in Kashmir. Rape, she says, is a common way to coerce marriage or to punish state 
informers. Although she roots these atrocities against women in the steady „corruption‟ of the militancy, there is less 
of a sense that such oppression is internal to the logic of militarist political cultures, and not merely an accidental 
product of their perverse forms. Such a distinction between a „true‟ militancy and a „corrupted‟ version (which 
mirrors the larger distinction between „good‟ and „bad‟ violence) might also explain her more positive evaluation of 
the Maoist movement in Nepal that offers women, as we have seen, however contradictorily, the possibility of 
emancipation and agency.  
x
 Politicized motherhood is, of course, central to the revolutionary imaginary in south Asia (as elsewhere) from 
religio-political struggles to ethnonationalist ones to secular left-led class struggles. In these varied contexts, the use 
of motherhood, even a militant maternity, tends to underline the retraditionalisation of women within the public 
domain. See in this regard, de Alwis 1998; de Mel 2001; Haq 2007.   
xi
 Young (2003; 2007) has recently unpacked the „logic of masculine protection‟ in US security discourse in which a 
feminised „protectee‟ is to be protected by the good violence of a masculine „protector‟ against the bad violence of an 
aggressor. The rhetoric of protection also resonates with just war thinking more generally in which women are 
„beautiful souls‟ that need to be protected by „just warriors‟. For a recent feminist appraisal of just war thinking, see 
Sjoberg 2008, and for an older critique of the language of protection particularly in relation to the state, see Sunder 
Rajan & Pathak 1992 
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xii
 In a recent piece, Sarbani Bandyopadhyay (2008) observes how contemporary Naxalite-led movements in central 
India fail to question and thus uphold the patriarchal ideology of feminine modesty in discourses of community 
honour even when considering the sexual abuse of women. Such unquestioned patriarchal assumptions blunt the 
edge of their radical politics. While this article is exceptionally scathing of the patriarchal ideology of the Naxalites, 
it fails to unpack the patriarchal assumptions on which their defence and use of violence relies. As with most 
feminist critiques, the question of violence remains separate from that of women‟s emancipation.   
xiii
Given that violence threatens such forms of human communication and cooperation, it diminishes rather than 
enhances power: „violence can destroy power; it is ultimately incapable of creating it‟ (Arendt 1970). Violence is, in 
fact, a sign of powerlessness; rulers tend to resort to violence when they have lost power and legitimacy in the face 
of their people.    
xiv
 On the limitations of binary thinking especially around power-as-exclusion and power-as-inclusion in Indian 
feminist thought, see Gedalof 1999.   
 
 
 
